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Abstract 
Herein is the project entitled “Two Philosophical Views upon Morality 
and Religion”. The content of this project will include an introduction to 
the two philosophers, Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson, which is 
followed by a close account of their ideas upon morality and religion in 
Kant’s works, The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of Practical 
Reason, and Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion. 
Furthermore, there will be a discussion of the major differences and 
similarities between Kant’s and Bergson’s philosophy of morality and 
religion, which is followed by a conclusion of the project.   
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Introduction 
Living in a constantly changing and more global society, where distances 
between cultures and nations become ever smaller, we are continuously 
trying to find ourselves as individual beings. It can be a life long journey 
for us humans to find our place within society and the rules that follow, 
when at the same time wanting to advocate our own autonomy and will. 
Morality has always been an intensively debated issue within philosophy, 
where Immanuel Kant has been one of the most influential thinkers 
within this topic. The issue of morality still exists today, especially 
concerning the question of morality’s conflict with one’s autonomy in 
relation to the laws giving by society. Does this then imply that society’s 
necessity of citizen’s participation limits the autonomy of the individual? 
Who actually decides what is morally right or wrong, and what exactly 
can be defined as morality? There are many questions to be considered. 
Throughout time religion has played a large role concerning the question 
of what can be considered morally right or wrong. As a result religion has 
often attempted to set a morally good example for humans to follow. But 
is religion really necessary in regards to morality? And what other 
concepts are necessary for the individual’s moral judgment? Humans 
posses intelligence and consequently have the ability to reason. To act 
morally, one necessarily has to have the ability to understand the 
consequences of an action, subsequently one uses reason. But how is 
reason to be considered an important factor in the matter of religion? And 
is there a genuine connection between morality, reason and religion?´ 
 
This project aims at analyzing and discussing Immanuel Kant and Henri 
Bergson’s views upon morality and religion. These two philosophers are 
different in several ways, and it is our intention to see if there is a relation 
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between their views upon morality and religion. It is of particular interest 
to discover the role of reason in Bergson’s approach to morality and 
religion, knowing that Kant’s a priori methodology is completely 
depending on the rational being’s ability to reason. It is also interesting to 
note how they differ - not only academically, but also in terms of their 
cultural and historical background. Despite of these facts, our main focus 
will be on their philosophy of morality and religion. We will use their 
major works, such as The Critique of Pure Reason and The Critique of 
Practical Reason by Immanuel Kant and The Two sources of Morality 
and Religion by Henri Bergson, in order to compare, analyze and discuss 
the two philosophical views upon morality and religion. 
 
Motivation 
From the start we were all very interested in focusing on the topics of 
morality and religion, and furthermore in discovering the relation 
between the two concepts. We initiated the project by looking further into 
the works of Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson, since it was clear from 
the beginning that both philosophers dealt with morality and religion 
quite differently. Even though the philosophers, particularly Kant, were 
before our time, their themes and not a least their books are still widely 
discussed and relevant in regards to the ongoing debate of morality and 
religion. These were all aspects that contributed to the motivation of 
writing this project. 
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Problem Formulation 
Research Question 
With respect to their philosophy of morality and religion, in which ways 
and why, do Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson differ, if at all?  
Sub-questions 
• What are the primary ideas of Kant’s moral philosophy? 
• What are the primary ideas of Kant’s philosophy of religion? 
• How is Kant’s moral philosophy connected to his notion of 
religion? 
• What are the primary ideas of Bergson’s moral philosophy? 
• What are the primary ideas of Bergson’s philosophy of religion? 
• How is Bergson’s moral philosophy connected to his notion of 
religion? 
• How does the concept of reason influence both Kant and Bergson’s 
philosophy of morality and religion? 
 
Dimensions 
We plan to cover the dimension of Science and Philosophy, since we are 
focusing on two influential philosophers’ views upon morality and 
religion. 
 
Methodology  
We have commenced the project by giving an introduction to why 
morality and religion has been so intensively debated throughout history. 
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Hereafter we will provide an analysis of Kant’s moral philosophy and 
philosophy of religion, followed by an analysis of Bergson’s perception 
of the same subject matters. In order to analyze Kant’s philosophy we 
will include primary literature such as The Critique of Pure Reason and 
The Critique of Practical Reason. When analyzing Bergson we will 
primarily use The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, furthermore we 
will be using different readers to get a good understanding of both 
philosophers’ concepts. These concepts will be the tools for our 
discussion, provided by both philosophers within their study of morality 
and religion. Consequently we will aim at discussing in which ways the 
philosophers differ in means of their approach, as well as revealing 
possible similarities.  
 
Delimitations  
In our project we have chosen to focus on morality and religion, with the 
main focus on Immanuel Kant’s The Critique of Pure Reason, The 
Critique of Practical Reason and Henri Bergson’s The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion. When studying the subject matters of morality and 
religion, numerous as well as complex questions arise. Just within the 
field of philosophy of religion important questions have aroused in many 
different areas such as metaphysics, epistemology and moral philosophy. 
Nonetheless, we have chosen only to compare these philosophers’ views 
upon morality and religion, and our main concern will thus not be 
morality and religion in general. 
At first we also wanted to add a history dimension to our project, as the 
Kant and Bergson stem from two different time periods, we found that it 
would be interesting to compare the two philosophers’ time periods its 
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influences on their works. The purpose of making this comparison was to 
see whether these aspects played an essential role in forming the 
philosopher’s ideas or not. It was also of interest to see if their historical 
background had an impact upon their different conceptions of morality 
and religion. However, after reading more of their works, we did not find 
this comparison essential for the project. Instead we choose to commit 
our entire focus to discuss their different ideas of morality and religion. 
Nevertheless we will not give a critical examination of their philosophies, 
in terms of validity in regards to their philosophical claims.   
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Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
Immanuel Kant was born in the East Prussian city of Königsberg in 1724. 
At the year of eight, he attended the Collegium Fridericianum, a school 
that was highly influenced by Pietism, which meant that physics were 
only acceptable as long as their results did not undermine the Bible. The 
students were in general subject to very strict schedules and strong 
discipline – what Kant would later recall as the “slavery of his youth” 
(SEP), and what clearly had a strong influence on his philosophical 
approach to religion later in his career. After eight years at Collegium 
Fridericianum, Kant went to the University Of Königsberg where he 
spent his early academic years studying philosophy, mathematics and 
physics. After graduating in 1755, Kant stayed at the university for 
almost his entire life, attracting an increasing amount of students due to 
his radical approach to the study of religion. However, his “unorthodox” 
teachings entailed political pressure on Kant, which eventually meant that 
he was banned from teaching and writing on religious subjects by King 
Fredrich William II – an order which he obeyed until the death of the 
king in 1797.  
 
A Priori Methodology 
Kant preferred to have his philosophical inquiries based upon a 
theoretical thesis, rather than a practical investigation, a so called a priori 
methodology. One could compare the approach with a "thesis", thus in an 
oversimplified definition, it is non-empirical at its first stage, and 
independent of experience. This has been Kant's preferred methodology 
where the truth of statements can be judged without initiating a larger 
investigation, namely by the use of logic and common sense. According 
to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP), the mathematical 
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calculation rules can be used as an example, or the statement that the 
shortest distance between two points is a straight line. It is however 
important to note the difference between a priori and a posteriori 
(methodology). The latter being the opposite of Kant’s preferred 
methodology, which could roughly be explained as having truth based 
upon experience, such as empirical studies and research. According to 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Kant offers several reasons for 
choosing an a priori methodology, which he argues for repeatedly.  
 
Kant conceives ethics as being constructed of our moral concepts, and 
that an understanding our moral concepts requires a beforehand analysis 
of how the different concepts, such as duty, reason, good will and the 
categorical imperative, are related to one another other. So taking that an 
analysis of concepts is a priori, the ethics being analyzed would also be a 
priori. Kant further urges us to understand the logical reason of 
approaching issues in ethics a priori by using the ability to choose 
between reason and instinct, by arguing that an a posteriori methodology 
would only tell us what we actually do, and not what we must, which 
would be the aim of an a priori methodology (SEP). All in all, one must 
follow Kant's line of argumentation and reasoning in order to give in to 
the premises of which he bases his study. 
 
Important Concepts within Kant’s Moral Philosophy: 
Reason   
An essential part of Kant’s moral philosophy, and what he is famous for 
bringing into the field of morality, is the concept of reason – the human 
being’s ability to reason, and thus its ability to control its instinct. Kant’s 
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entire moral philosophy revolves around the concept that, what differ 
humans from animals is the intellect, and thus ability to think rationally, 
as in being able to choose whether or not to give in to a momentarily 
desire. Acting according to one’s reason is the main stepping stone for the 
categorical imperative, the latter being an action that obeys a universal 
law. A counter-example to the categorical imperative could be the 
following: 
 
A son decides to kill his father. This is still a rational action, but 
obviously one based a momentarily desire rather than reason, and thus not 
a categorical imperative, since the action of killing people cannot be a 
part of a universal law, because this would allow everybody to kill each 
other. This is thereby only a hypothetical imperative, in this case, a 
person deciding to kill his father in order to obtain revenge. Hypothetical 
imperatives, as opposed to the categorical imperative, are not necessarily 
moral actions, but more a concept which describes what one might act 
upon, based on one’s personal interest in archiving an end. 
 
The Categorical Imperative 
The categorical imperative is thus a notion that has the individual’s 
ability to reason as the main premise, and it is perhaps one of Kant’s most 
genuine and widespread philosophical ideas of morality. The categorical 
requires you to: 
“Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it becomes a universal law” (SEP)  
This means that in order to suffice the categorical imperative, you have to 
act in a collectively accepted way, hence an action that can be applied 
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under the formulated circumstances. However, for the categorical 
imperative to work it must not use people as ways of obtaining a certain 
goal, in other words, people can never be used as means, but only as 
ends in themselves (SEP). We will illustrate this with the following 
example: 
If John decides to do something in favour of his friend Bill, then Bill 
would in this case be an end. John has so far been acting in accordance to 
the categorical imperative. However, if John decides to kill his other 
friend Jamie in order to help Bill, whom Bill owes money; he is violating 
the Categorical Imperative, by using Jamie as a means of obtaining an 
end (the end being helping Bill). 
 
In order to understand exactly how a morally right action is defined 
according to Kant, scholars who have studied Kant’s Categorical 
Imperatives have summarized it into a four-step process; (SEP).  
 
1. Construct a maxim that works as a guideline for acting in 
accordance with your own reason. 
2. Apply this maxim as a universal law, which must be a followed 
by all rational beings, as was it a natural law to act in the way 
you propose under the specific circumstances. 
3. Reflect upon the consequence of the stated maxim instated as a 
law of nature, and whether it is conceivable or not. 
4. Imagine yourself in the situation of an agent bound to live by 
your maxim - would you then, according to your on rationality, 
will to act in a world governed by your maxim. 
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If your can fulfil these four requirements, then your action can according 
to Kant be considered to be a morally responsible action, and thus 
qualifies as a categorical imperative. 
 
Duty 
According to Kant our motivation to commit an action of duty is due our 
instinctive respect of laws. Duties are therefore actions based upon an 
integrated law, a code, which responds to law in any layer, be it domestic, 
regional or national. There is however a consideration of personal 
conflict, if the law that must be obeyed clashes with your own personal 
values and principles. (SEP)  
 
Imagine the following situation. You are in a nightclub and act according 
to the normative codex - you dance, socialize, fool around with random 
strangers and get into a few a fights – the usual night club behaviour for 
most people. However, you might choose not to drink alcohol due to your 
personal beliefs and values. Thereby part of the night club codex of 
behaviour, in this case the drinking culture, clashes with a personal 
maxim that you normally act upon. 
 
The point is to show that our respect for laws work as a guidance upon 
practical affairs, but are only relevant as long as they do not violate the 
laws of our own practical reason. One could say that duty constitutes a 
moral obligation, a commitment to moral law.  
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Autonomy 
At the core of Kant's moral philosophy, we have the concept of 
autonomy. In this specific context it is to be understood as the liberty of 
the rational human being’s will, which are attached to two terminologies 
of autonomy, namely the negative and positive. Freedom is in the sense 
of negative autonomy under as the ability to free ourselves from outer 
factors’ influence on our moral judgment, whilst freedom in the sense of 
positive autonomy is to be able to choose our own willing. (Luchte, 2007: 
24-25) 
 
We have tried to simplify the conception of autonomy with the following 
example:  
Imagine a man sitting in his car, waiting for the lights to turn green. 
Suddenly he is enraged by a honking car behind him, and instinctively 
goes out of his own car and hits the person who was honking at him. 
This would not fit Kant's terminology of free will, due to the fact that he 
is enraged by an outside factor, which influences his control in willing to 
hurt the person, which the rational human being would find immoral after 
coming to his senses. In this way, the concept of autonomy and duty are 
both related to the practice of willing an action. 
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Summum Bonum 
Kant defined the summum bonum as a product of virtue along with 
happiness, with the major emphasis on the former, namely virtue. 
Summum is Latin for either the supreme or perfect, while bonum simply 
means good. Within Kantianism the most commonly used term is the 
highest good, however, we will to stick to the former Latin term, as it has 
been a vividly discussed philosophical concept since the Ancients. 
 "Kant argued that this Highest Good for Humanity is complete moral 
virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition 
of our deserving the latter." (SEP) 
In order to understand the above mentioned quote properly, it is important 
to clarify Kant’s notion of happiness. Kant does not define happiness in 
terms of pleasure, but as “the satisfaction with one’s whole existence” and 
regards it a naturzweck, a natural purpose, of every rational human being: 
 ”To be happy is necessarily the demand of every rational but finite 
being…” (Kant, 2004: 23) 
Furthermore, no matter how convenient and obvious the notion of 
happiness may seem, it is not the main postulate of the summum bonum. 
In The Critique of Pure Practical Reason, Kant criticizes the Ancients’ 
approach to the balancing virtue and happiness, and argues that virtue 
has to be the primary requisite, since it is the supreme condition of all 
that can appear to us desirable (Kant, 2004: 118).  
“If a man is virtuous without being conscious of his integrity in every 
action, he will certainly not enjoy life.” (Kant, 2004: 124) 
By this Kant attempts to optimize the Ancient Schools of Philosophy’s 
approach to the perception of the summum bonum, by raising awareness 
to the importance of the individual’s ability to see the virtue of his moral 
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actions. Kant argues that the summum bonum furthermore consist of three 
elements, namely freedom, immortality of the soul and the existence of 
God, which we will devote our attention to in the following pages.  
 
Freedom 
Other than freedom for the individual, the autonomy that, as we 
mentioned in the previous chapter, allows us to free our moral judgment 
from the influence of outside factors, Kant’s summum bonum consists of 
two other postulates, immortality of the soul and the existence of God 
(Kant, 2004: 143-144). These three elements together indicate the 
introduction of religion into Kantian morality. Freedom, or autonomy, is 
a necessity in order to act according to the categorical imperative, since 
one must will the end. In this way the limits of human reasoning 
influence the freedom of the rational being. If one were to consider a 
rational being of omniscient character, his omniscience would necessarily 
limit his actions. According to Heiner Bielefeldt, professor of philosophy 
at the University of Bremen, “if the will were to depend on the 
expectation that virtue will finally receive its due reward, be it in this 
world or in the hereafter, then the incentive of action would indeed be 
heteronomous not autonomous” (Bielefeldt, 2003: 157) 
 
The Immortality of the Soul 
The first of the two presuppositions, as Kant terms it, is the immortality 
of the soul. It is defined as the supposition of an endless duration of the 
existence and personality of the same rational being (Kant, 2004: 130), 
meaning that the individual is enabled to see an endless succession of 
his/her moral actions, by supposing, as in believing in, eternity, as in an 
18 
 
endless duration. These are considered the characteristics of the infinite 
being, the one to whom the condition of time is not an issue. On the other 
hand, the best case scenario for the finite being is limited to experience a 
progression from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection (Kant, 
2004: 131).  
 
The Existence of God 
In his book Symbolic Representation in Kant’s Practical Philosophy, 
Heiner Bienefeldt emphasizes how Kant has a radically different 
approach to proving the existence of God, namely by emphasizing the 
practical necessity of God in connection to morality.  
 
“It is the inner moral consciousness, not the external order of nature, that 
provides the ultimate basis for a “proof” of God’s existence that itself 
therefore cannot claim the status of scientific cognition but, instead, 
belongs to a practical metaphysic.” (Bienefeldt, 2003: 165) 
 
By this he explains how Kant uses God in relation to the cornerstone of 
his moral philosophy, namely the summum bonum. The necessity of the 
concept of a deity is due to the rational being’s desire to constitute a 
higher reason for living in accordance to categorical imperative. This is 
what Kant calls the expectation of a cause adequate to this effect, the 
cause being God and the effect being the universal law (Kant, 2004: 133). 
Inevitably this position will lead the individual to expect happiness as a 
consequence of a virtuous way of life, however true morality can only 
spring from an autonomous will, and therefore virtue must be the primary 
factor of moral conduct, as explained previously in the construction of the 
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summum bonum.  To accept the condition of the summum bonum will 
thereby entail that the individual is submitted to faith. Kant’s 
controversial view upon the existence of God within the field of science 
builds upon mere reason and can therefore be explained through means of 
his moral philosophy. Kant’s explanation of the existence of God 
therefore necessarily requires the individual have faith, as he writes in the 
Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (1787), “I 
had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”  (SEP) 
 
One might notice that Kant neither tries to prove or counter prove the 
existence of God, but merely supposes the rationality and logic of His 
existence. As opposed to other philosophers before his time, Kant does 
not attempt to prove the existence of God using for example the 
cosmological argument, that is, that every event has a cause, and thus 
also the universe. However, it is important to note that even though 
Kant’s critical point of view dismantles the arguments of previous 
philosophers to a certain extent, it also provides a valuable account of 
how the affirmation of God influences moral endeavor. Since complete 
morality might not be possible to obtain in this life, the moral faith 
becomes an essential premise for the individual’s effort in seeking the 
summum bonum (SEP, Appiah 2003: 317-322). 
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From a moral perspective, the existence of God thereby accompanies the 
rational necessity of summum bonum. To sum up, the prerequisites of the 
latter are thus:  
• Freedom – since autonomy is a necessity of true morality 
• Immortality of the Soul – in order to see an endless succession of 
one’s moral actions 
• The Existence of God – since the individual expects a cause 
adequate to the effect 
 
The summum bonum is then only practically possible on the supposition 
of the immortality of the soul; consequently this immortality is connected 
to the moral law, as a postulate of pure practical reason. 
 
Until Kant introduces the summum bonum, he has been able to deal with 
moral philosophy on a strictly logical level, without the involvement of 
any religion or metaphysical reference. However, his answer to the 
question of why we should care to act morally at all is very much in need 
of a Supreme Being. Nevertheless, he fills the gap by bringing in the 
concept of summum bonum, which ultimately leads to the incorporation 
of religion. It seems that Kant's ultimate answer to why the individual 
should act according to its reason, is the fact that we, as rational beings 
strive for moral perfection, despite being unattainable in practice. Thus, 
by acting virtuous and benevolent, the individual reaches its highest 
attainable point by the immortality of the soul. Complete virtue in this 
world, therefore gives makes the individual worthy of happiness in the 
hereafter, but only on grounds of acceptance of a condition, namely the 
acknowledgement of a Supreme Being. Morality can therefore also be 
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considered as the set of guidelines that describes how we can become 
worthy of happiness – and not how we make ourselves happy. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that the theory of moral law functions 
independently of our motivation or hope of gaining back what we have 
given as virtuous beings. Just as the principle of charity, we do not expect 
anything in return, at least not in this world, but truly one has taken a step 
further to make himself worthy of happiness in the hereafter. 
Nevertheless the logic of acting in accordance to the categorical 
imperative still remains, so if we were to use the above mentioned 
example, one can still state that “people who are extremely fortunate 
should occasionally share their fortune with those who are less 
fortunate”1. If we run the maxim through the four conditions of the 
categorical imperative, we can assume that this could pass as a 
categorical imperative. Consequently we can conclude that the motivation 
itself for acting according to the categorical imperative, besides the 
logical side of it, is the only factor which is in need of the summum 
bonum to explain itself. 
 
It is now possible to conclude that the genuine perception of happiness 
does not entirely cover the exact notion which Kant wanted to present, 
since happiness contributes to a false understanding of the rational being 
acting according to the categorical imperative, in order to obtain 
happiness in the mortal world. For the sake of understanding the notion of 
being worthy of happiness, one could draw a parallel to a well-known 
concept, namely the notion of benevolence promoted through 
                                                 
1 Note that this is an everyday life statement constituted by the authors, and not a reference. 
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Christianity,  “(…)Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself2”, which 
encourages us to live like the good Samaritan. The shift from morality to 
faith, may have led the reader to reflect upon the influence of religion on 
Kant’s moral philosophy, however Kant does not base his morality on 
Christianity, but merely illustrates his concept of morality through means 
of religion. Happiness is to be considered as a second element of the 
summum bonum (Kant, 1788: 127), which therefore means that the 
rational being, who has accepted the categorical imperative, can obtain 
happiness after reaching summum bonum by acting virtuously and “(…) 
only in such a way that it is the morally conditioned, but necessary 
consequence of the former (…)”3 (Kant, 1788:127), which is why religion 
can not be the basis of morality. 
 
  
                                                 
2 The Bible, Romans 13:9 - King James version 
3 The former being the summum bonum. 
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Henri Bergson (1859-1941) 
Henri Bergson was one of the most influential French philosophers 
during the 20th century. Bergson reached a cult-like status during his 
lifetime, but his influence decreased remarkably after his death. However 
since the 1990s there has been a reawakening interest in Bergson’s 
philosophy especially due to Gilles Deleuze’s book “Bergsonism” from 
1966 (SEP). Bergson first studied mathematics, but eventually chose to 
study in the humanities department at the École Normale, where he 
graduated in 1881. In 1928, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature 
for his book Creative Evolution. The Two Sources of Morality and 
Religion was published in 1932, which started new debates and confusion 
about Bergson’s former philosophy and not at least on his religious 
orientation (SEP). 
 
Moral Obligation 
In the first chapter of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion entitled 
Moral Obligation, Bergson starts out his work by contemplating on how 
humans since birth are following the demands and prohibitions from their 
parents and teachers. He points out how children hardly ever question 
these regulations4, as it becomes a habit to follow one’s parents and 
teachers, because of the authority we perceive them to have. Later in life 
humans will come to realize that behind these demands from our parents 
and teachers lies society, that lays “pressure on us through them” 
(Bergson, 1977: 9). Further from this point, Bergson sees to compare this 
thought with the cells of an organism. Each cell has its certain hierarchic 
                                                 
4 Remember, we are talking about 1932, not 2008 ☺ 
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place, where it seeks to maintain its given discipline and habits “for the 
greatest good of the organism” (Bergson, 1977: 9). Though what 
separates the almost unbreakable laws of an organism to that of a human 
society is that the latter is made up by free wills. If these wills then are to 
be organized they will more likely resemble the appearance of an 
organism. Social life will in this sense be “a system of more or less 
deeply rooted habits, corresponding to the needs of the community” 
(Bergson, 1977: 10).These habits are both from command and obedience, 
and with these habits come a sense of obligation, what Bergson terms 
social obligation. The pressure from social obligation is of great power, 
and each of these different habits are enforced upon the members of 
society to communicate a social necessity. Though, why should one 
follow these demands from society, instead of one’s own desires and 
fantasies? Bergson argues how a person, ready to follow his own way 
instead of considering his fellow-men, is likely to be dragged back by 
social forces soon after. However, this sense of necessity together with 
the consciousness of the possibility to break it is what he calls an 
obligation. (Bergson, 1977: 14) While man belongs to a society, Bergson 
upholds that man also belongs to himself. Individuals are in life in 
interdependence with others, but “obligation, which we look upon as a 
bond between men, first binds us to ourselves” (Bergson, 1977: 15). In 
order to uphold social solidarity among men, a special social ego is to be 
added to the individual self, and to nurture this ego is in fact the core of 
the individual’s obligation to society. However, man in society has a 
social conscience, where the “verdict of conscience is the verdict which 
would be given by the social self” (Bergson, 1977: 17). The individual is 
aware of the rules laid down by society, and if these are somehow broken, 
it would cause moral distress in the relationship between the individual 
and society. Additionally individuals have other factors that connect them 
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with society, such as a family, a job, a sense of nationality and more, to 
where they have a social obligation as well. This when the daily routines 
drawn up by society show, and where most people merely aim at 
fulfilling these duties and tasks, without being entirely conscious of it. It 
is only when obedience is seen as an overcoming of the self that the 
consciousness arises.  
 
Furthermore, Bergson implies how one’s ability to reason is used stick to 
one’s duties and resist one’s own desires and needs. “An intelligent being 
generally exerts his influence on himself through the medium of 
intelligence” (Bergson, 1977: 22). Though, one thing is that reason is 
used as a tool to get back to obligation, this, Bergson believes, does not 
necessarily entail that obligation derives from reason or rationality. To 
sum up, the totality of obligation is the collected amount of obligations, 
each one having its force on the will in the form of a habit, where all 
obligations work together as the pressure imposed upon the ordinary, 
moral conscience. 
 
Bergson goes further to compare obligation in its basic state with the 
form of a “categorical imperative”, (“how slightly Kantian!”) (Bergson, 
1977: 25). He includes the saying: “You must because you must” 
(Bergson, 1977: 25), an order humans can come to face in life in many 
different ways, standing in front of the obligations of life. To get back to 
the act of reasoning, Bergson implies that instinct in this case comes 
before reason. When man reflects upon his situation, he will not 
contemplate “enough to seek for reasons” (Bergson, 1977: 26) - an 
absolutely categorical imperative will in this way be instinctive. 
However, while the obligations of human society together with 
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obligations in general can be seen to lead back to instinct, Bergson claims 
that it would be a mistake not to include intelligence, which is what 
separates humans from animals. While both species are born with 
instinct, humans have also have intelligence from the hands of nature. 
Therefore human beings can ponder about their own situation, whereas 
for example a bee will not reflect upon its work in the bee-hive, as it is a 
natural instinct for it to work for the greatest good.  
However there has been a change through time from the primitive 
societies to the society of today, especially with the accumulated amount 
of habits and knowledge civilized man has in present time. Nonetheless, 
they still have one great similarity: They are both closed societies: “Their 
essential character is none the less to include at any moment a certain 
number of individuals, and exclude others” (Bergson, 1977: 30). When a 
person has a moral obligation to its society, it is a closed morality for that 
specific society, and not for others. One can soon think of war time, 
where individuals fight for the maintenance of the social cohesion in their 
society, and tries to protect themselves against others. While this social 
instinct in social obligation is not fairly changeable, a closed society is 
still large (Bergson, 1977: 32). It can be changed from the closed to the 
open society, from the closed to the open morality.  
 
Open Morality 
To go from the closed to the open morality is to take a new path away 
from the pressures of society, towards a new and different morality 
embracing all of humanity. In all aspects of time, Bergson finds that some 
outstanding people have outlived this morality, by turning their faces to 
that “complete morality” or “absolute morality” (Bergson, 1977: 34). It 
is thereby a morality focusing on the human, whereas the first morality is 
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social. This shift from the first to the second is “not one of degree but of 
kind” (Bergson, 1977: 35). Individuals will not reach humanity just by 
thinking that he loves other societies or would like to, as these thoughts 
will remain thoughts. The real open morality or open soul will on the 
other hand be able to love all of humanity. It is an unconditional and self-
sufficient love that does need to be aimed at a specific entity, as it is 
already loving. The attitude acquired here calls for an effort, an effort that 
only by emotion can guide the will beyond the constraints of social 
pressure. The emotions that men have from nature, based on their instinct, 
are limited to only act according to their own needs. Emotions in the open 
morality are instead genuine inventions, “at the origin of which there has 
always been man” (Bergson, 1977: 41). Bergson goes further to describe 
two different kinds of emotions, one happening in the closed obligation, 
the other in the open. The first emotion, that needs an object for it to be 
affected, is what Bergson calls the infra-intellectual, whereas the other is 
called supra-intellectual, an emotion already filled with ideas and 
sensations (Bergson, 1977: 44). The open soul will thus want to act 
according to these emotions and seeks to be positively inspired by them, 
and will not see them as forced restrictions from outside, but something it 
naturally wants to hold on to. To sum up, to the new morality “there is 
the emotion, which develops as an impetus in the realm of the will, and as 
an explicative representation in that of intelligence” (Bergson, 1977: 49) 
 
Mystics, saints and formers of religions are some of those exceptional 
men that throughout history have conquered the constraints of nature and 
pressure from the closed societies, and thereby lifted humanity to a new 
fate. Humans have been and are following these men, whom they look 
upon as heroes. To once again light up the difference between the closed 
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and the open morality, one could call the first pressure and latter 
aspiration (Bergson, 1977: 50). Pressure is the picture of a society 
wanting to maintain social cohesion. If these obligations are 
accomplished it would most likely cause the emotion of pleasure; 
“Morality of aspiration on the contrary, implicitly contains the feeling of 
progress“(Bergson, 1977: 51). Between the first and the second morality 
is the distance between rest and motion, where the latter is seeking for 
this motion, which is seen as a transition stage. When the soul goes from 
being closed to being open, the closed morality will not absorbed by the 
new morality. Rather, it has instead been transformed - the new morality 
has gone beyond intelligence. To find out where this new morality 
derives from, one has to go back to the evolution of life and the intention 
nature had with humans. Nature gave the individual intelligence to 
separate them from animals, yet nature still intended man to be sociable, 
and for the necessary maintenance of social cohesion habits were formed, 
which shaped the instinct. Thus the original moral construction was made 
for closed societies (Bergson, 1977: 56). Bergson further claims how 
nature could thereby not have foreseen how intelligence would develop, 
but by no means have wanted it to cause danger to the original structure 
of morality. As the closed societies should remain in the closed circle, 
nature would be surprised how some individuals have gone beyond nature 
to broaden “his social solidarity into the brotherhood of man” (Bergson, 
1977: 57). Intelligence has developed as a helping hand to free humans 
from restrictions of nature, to express “nature as constituting itself anew” 
(Gutting, 2001: 78). This is the work of a man’s genius.  
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Justice and Reason 
Justice is one of the moral ideas that have developed in history caused, by 
the creative effort of exceptional men, with a transition from relative to 
absolute justice. The relative justice takes form in a society, being one 
obligation out of many that serves social cohesion. It does not have a 
specific privilege, or more specifically a concern towards the individual. 
It is due to Christianity, Bergson believes, that there has been a transition 
from the relative or closed to the absolute or open justice. It is precisely 
these exceptional men, who have introduced the idea of ‘universal 
brotherhood’ (Bergson, 1977: 78). They have through “an effort of 
creation” with the endless power of love seized to take justice toward 
freedom and equality. The moral progress is to be explained as: 
“(…) moral creators who see in their mind’s eye a new social 
atmosphere, an environment in which life would be more worth living, I 
mean a society such, that if men once tried it, they would refuse to go 
back to the old state of things” (Bergson, 1977: 80)                                                          
To return to the act of reasoning, Bergson claims that “moral activity in a 
civilized society is essentially rational” (Bergson, 1977: 81). Certain 
standards have been set in society for individuals to follow, whereby they 
will use their reason to find it rational to follow these guidelines. Even for 
the open morality, there will always be this fundamental framework for 
pure obligation, which is the obligation deriving from the side of nature 
linking humans to their society. However, the open morality in an open 
society will still be embracing all of humanity, by going further than the 
pressure of the closed society, to a new morality of aspiration. This 
aspiration is an ideal, Bergson believes. The mystics, who through time 
have exalted societies and given them new ideals and perspectives to the 
world, have given rise to a two-sided morality of the civilized humanity 
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in present time: The old system of “impersonal social requirements” 
together with awareness about the best there is in humanity, shown by the 
mystics (Bergson, 1977: 84). This organization of moral life, Bergson 
finds to be self-sufficient and rational (Bergson, 1977: 85). But as 
mentioned before, obligation and morality do not necessarily derive from 
pure reason. Though many philosophers before Bergson have taken the 
view of morality developed in reason, he finds this explanation unlikely. 
For him “real obligation is already there, and whatever reason impresses 
upon it assumes naturally an obligatory character” (Bergson, 1977: 89). 
The concept of real obligation is made in society, according to how much 
the individual partakes in the protection of the social cohesion. Reason 
will from there ‘more or less rediscover morality” (Bergson, 1977: 89). 
The way individuals reason will be an outcome of society, where the act 
of reasoning has then been socialized. 
 
The mystics who have been the only ones capable of transforming 
morality from the closed to the open have made a creative evolution, 
where each one with a love so great and with “an entirely new emotion, 
capable of transposing human life into another tone” (Bergson, 1977: 
99).  However, while the mystics are real living creatures in the world, 
Bergson does not know whether there exists an open society at all:  
 
“Now a mystic society, embracing all humanity and moving, animated by 
a common will, towards the continually renewed creation of a more 
complete humanity, is no more possible of realization in the future than 
was the existence in the past of human societies functioning automatically 
and similar to animal societies. Pure aspiration is an ideal limit, just like 
obligation unadorned” (Bergson, 1977: 84).  
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Nonetheless, mystics have shown and are continuing “to draw civilized 
societies in their wake” (Bergson, 1977: 84). 
Static Religion 
Just as Bergson distinguishes between closed and open morality, he also 
distinguishes between static religion and dynamic religion. Static religion 
is connected to the closed morality which is present in closed society. 
Static religion serves as a function that will protect the “control” of 
society against human intelligence. Even though human society holds 
some similarities to those of ants and bees, where the society is based on 
instinct, humans differ from animals, as they have the ability to reason 
and question their individual place in society (Gutting, 2001: 78). This 
particular skill makes humans possible to break free from society and 
refuse to fulfill their social obligations, which society entails. According 
to Bergson, such refusal would however only develop either from 
selfishness (Bergson, 1977: 122) or from the despair that comes with the 
uncertainties of life and the fact that death is inevitable (Bergson, 1977: 
132).   
Static religion intervenes with myths about the universe and how humans 
fit into it. The myth-making function works by for example promising 
rewards or threatening humans with punishment in the afterlife and 
asserting that a higher “presence” is watching each of human’s actions 
(Bergson, 1977: 136). According to Bergson, “the pressure of instinct has 
given rise, within intelligence, to that form of imagination which is the 
myth-making function. Myth-making has but to follow its own course in 
order to fashion, out of the elementary personalities looming up at the 
outset, gods that assume more and more exalted form like those of 
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mythology, or deities ever more degraded, such as mere spirits.” 
(Bergson, 1977: 164)   
 
The ideas that are a part of the static religion and myth-making function 
are based on the “fabulation function”, which then creates “voluntary 
hallucinations” in human mind. These are images of gods and sprits, 
which then come to represent ideals for man to follow. These images also 
insure strict obedience to the closed morality and as a result insure social 
cohesion. In other words, right from the beginning of these beliefs, there 
was a defensive reaction of nature against the discouragement found in 
intelligence. “This reaction arouses within intelligence itself images and 
ideas which hold in check the depressing representation or prevent it 
from materializing.” (Bergson, 1977: 152) As stated above, static religion 
serves to ward off the dangers that could follow with human intelligence, 
and as a result static religion is seen as being infra-intellectual (Bergson, 
1977: 186). 
 
It must be understood that as a matter of fact, the individual and the 
society are interconnected. Individuals make up society, and consequently 
the society shapes a whole side of the individual. According to Bergson, 
“the individual and society thus condition each other, circle-wise.” 
(Bergson, 1977: 199) This circle, made by nature, can be broken once 
man is able to get back into the creative impetus and as a result push 
human nature forward instead of letting it revolve on the same spot. Once 
this circle is broken a new and more personal religion, namely dynamic 
religion, can be founded (Bergson, 1977: 199). In order to get at the very 
essence of religion, human must pass directly from the outer and static 
religion to the inner and dynamic religion.  
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Dynamic Religion 
In the third chapter of The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, 
Bergson outlines the concept of what he calls dynamic religion. In order 
to define the concept of dynamic religion, Bergson also takes a look at 
former primitive societies, as well as the ancient Greek and Roman, and 
furthermore draws examples to other religions, in particular Buddhism 
and Hinduism.  
According to Bergson, whether it is static or dynamic religion, religion 
must be taking at its origins. Static religion was embedded in nature, 
whereas dynamic religion is seen as something which goes beyond nature 
(Bergson, 1935: 223). Bergson explains that dynamic religion consists of 
creativity and progress and furthermore clarifies that it is not made up by 
any organized set of rules. Dynamic religion is however motivated 
through a morality of aspiration and the divine love for human kind, 
compared to static religion, which is motivated through force and the 
fulfillment of needs. The morality, which drives dynamic religion 
forward, is what Bergson refers to as an absolute morality (Gutting, 2001: 
75). Nevertheless dynamic religion must be acquired through a direct and 
spiritual experience of God. Hence, dynamic religion is seen as being 
embedded in mysticism. (Bergson, 1935: 213)    
 
As a result, it is through this mystic experience of God that man can 
attain the highest stage within morality and religion. But in order to 
achieve the most perfect form of mysticism, practical action in the world 
is needed, or as Bergson phrases it, “the ultimate end of mysticism is the 
establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the 
creative effort which life itself manifest. This effort is of God, if it is not 
God himself.” (Bergson, 1932: 221) “Consequently, dynamic religion is 
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seen as being “supra-intellectual” (Bergson, 1935: 220). Mysticism is to 
be understood as the spirituality that comes with the direct experience of 
God – an experience of God, which is a kind of understanding that goes 
beyond the intellect. Ultimately true mysticism must be experienced 
(Bergson, 1935: 237). Mysticism often bring Eastern religions, such as 
Hinduism and Buddhism, to mind and do not strike as being naturally 
attached to Christianity; nevertheless mysticism is in fact at the core of 
Christian spirituality. Mysticism was never obtained by Greek thought, 
and according to Bergson it was never fully completed in Hinduism or 
Buddhism either:  
“Neither in Greece nor in the ancient India was there complete 
mysticism, in the one case because the impetus was not strong enough, in 
the other case because it was thwarted by material conditions or by too 
narrow an intellectual frame.” (Bergson, 1935: 227)  
However, complete mysticism would be that of action, creation and love. 
(Bergson, 1935: 225) Hence for Bergson there seems to be no doubt 
about it, “the complete mysticism is that of the great Christian mystics.” 
(Bergson, 1935: 227)  
 
Unlike static religion, dynamic religion is embraced more rarely and only 
by a small “selected” group of religious people, whom Bergson also 
refers to as the great mystics. The fundamental end for dynamic religion 
and mysticism would be to establish the contact with such an individual, 
who could become a great mystic and thus be able to rise above “the 
limitations imposed on the species by its material nature, thus continuing 
and extending the divine action.” (Bergson, 1935: 221) Dynamic religion 
is and have been spread through the experience of these selected few 
religious “heroes”, as for example St. Paul, St. Teresa and not at least 
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Jesus Christ himself, who were all devoted to spreading the Christian 
faith. The great mystics also serve as role models for the society, who can 
help inspire others to experience true mysticism and God, as these have 
reached a genuine insight to God, and consequently obtained an insight to 
true mysticism (Bergson, 1935: 228). It must be kept in mind that it is 
possible to mistake true mysticism with mystic insanity. Naturally we 
find raptures, ecstasies and visions abnormal, and that it is also difficult to 
make a distinction between the abnormal and the “morbid” state of mind, 
but the great mystics are aware of this. Nevertheless, the mystics have 
been able to leave raptures and ecstasies behind, and instead reached the 
desired end of recognition of the human will with the divine will. The fact 
is that “these abnormal states, resembling morbid states, and sometimes 
doubtless very much akin to them, are easily comprehensible, if we only 
stop to think what a shock to the soul is the passing from static to the 
dynamic, from the closed to the open, from everyday to mystic life.” 
(Bergson, 1935: 229)  
 
In order to attain this genuine understanding of true mysticism and to pass 
from static to dynamic religion, humans need to go through several 
transition phases. However close the union with God may be, it is only 
final if the union is total. This will happen when the fundamental division 
between “him who loves and him who is beloved” (Bergson, 1935: 230) 
is gone, and as a result God is present and happiness is unlimited. Even 
though the human soul, in both thought and feeling, is absorbed by God, 
the human will, which is seen as the essential action of the soul, remains 
left outside. Consequently, the union is not total and the soul is not yet 
divine (Bergson, 1935: 230). The soul is quite aware of this: 
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 “ (…) hence its vague disquietude, hence the agitation in repose which is 
the striking feature of what we call complete mysticism: it means that the 
impetus has acquired the momentum to go further, that ecstasy affects 
indeed the ability to see and to feel, but that there is, besides, the will, 
which itself has to find its way back to God.” (Bergson, 1935: 231)  
 
When this ecstasy and “revelation” of mysticism has vanished, the soul is 
once again left alone. The soul, which for a time was used to a “dazzling 
light” (Bergson, 1935: 231), is now groping in the darkness of society. 
The soul feels that it has lost everything, but does not realize what it is 
about to obtain, namely insight to true mysticism. This phase is referred 
to as the darkest night in Christian mysticism (Bergson, 1935: 231). At 
this instant, the final phase, which is characterized as the great mysticism, 
is just about to happen. The soul now desires to become God’s 
instrument. The soul is at this moment aware of the importance of 
throwing off anything, which is not pure enough for God to use. At this 
stage it is God, who is acting through the soul – this makes the union total 
as well as final. The soul has as a result become a superabundance of life 
(Bergson, 1935: 232). The love, which the soul is now concerned about, 
is not only the love for God, but the love of God for all humans. The soul, 
through God, loves all mankind with an open and divine love (Bergson, 
1935: 233). This kind of mystic love for humanity is not to be found in 
the senses or in the mind, but it lies at the root of feeling and reason 
(Bergson, 1935: 234). In order for mysticism to transform humanity, a 
part of it must be passed on from one man to another, generation after 
generation. Bergson therefore presents two very different methods, which 
are used in the transformation process.  
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For Bergson, religion is meant to be absorbed intellectually, on the other 
hand, mysticism must be experienced, as it would mean absolutely 
nothing to the human, who had not had a spiritual experience of God 
(Bergson, 1935: 237). Consequently, the first method finds it necessary to 
strengthen the intellectualization of humans to such an extent that “the 
simple tool would give place to a vast system of machinery such as might 
set human activity at liberty.” (Bergson, 1935: 235) This liberty, 
supported by a political or social organization, would make sure to be 
applied to its true object. However, this method is more complex than just 
anticipated and also seen as dangerous, because as it would develop, it 
could turn against mysticism. Thus, by using this method, there would be 
certain risks that should be taken, implicating that for example: 
 “(…) an activity of a superior kind, which to be operative requires one of 
a lower order, must call forth this activity, or a least permit it to function, 
if necessary, even at the cost of having to defend itself against it” 
(Bergson, 1935: 236)   
The second method consists of passing on the mystic impetus to a few 
privileged souls, which all together could form a spiritual society. With 
the help of the exceptionally gifted souls, the spiritual societies might 
then multiply. This would mean that the “impetus would be preserved and 
continued until such time as a profound change in the material conditions 
imposed on humanity by nature should permit, in spiritual matters, of a 
radical transformation” (Bergson, 1935: 236). This is the method applied 
by the great mystics.  
 
Bergson contemplates on how the first method can only be used by 
society much later, until then it is the second method that can be 
followed. The great mystics have come to use their superabundant energy 
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on founding these so called religious orders. The impetus of love, which 
will raise humanity closer to God and make the divine creation absolute, 
can only reach the goal through the mystics, with the help of God 
(Bergson, 1935: 236). Therefore, in order to reach the goal, all their effort 
must be aimed at this very difficult and still incomplete mission.  
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Discussion 
Morality 
Building upon the previous accounts of Kant’s and Bergson’s 
philosophical views upon morality and religion, we will now proceed to a 
discussion which will include an analytical examination and comparison 
of the two philosophers’ works. It is apparent after having gone through 
both subject matters that they differ in their way of approaching morality 
and religion. Our analysis will tell that morality and religion are 
inseparable factors within the works of both philosophers. However, for 
the sake of simplicity, we shall begin by discussing morality, prior to 
discussing religion. 
 
The main stepping stone of morality for both Kant and Bergson is the 
concept of moral obligation. While Kant primarily describes his ideal of 
what the individual should strive for, Bergson seeks explanation as to 
how the moral obligation of humans has been till now with his closed 
morality, and what they ought to strive for with the open morality. The 
issue with a comparison of the two philosophers arises from the manner 
in which they base their studies. As mentioned in the chapter concerning 
Kant’s morality, he seeks to give an account of morality, by maintaining 
an a priori methodology based upon reason - he does therefore not base 
his philosophy upon empirical data. Bergson, on the other hand, founds 
his philosophy in and upon a historical and societal context, which means 
that he uses empirical data as a part of the foundation, unlike Kant who 
maintains a strict a priori methodology. Taking both stands into account 
we will discuss the relation between reason, morality and religion as they 
seem inseparable for both philosophers.  
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As a base, Kant has reason constituting the very core of his moral 
philosophy, and by reason he dissociates the rational human being from 
animals, since humans have intellect and thereby the ability to reason and 
self-reflect. Bergson does not disregard reason from his moral 
philosophy, but it is nevertheless not used as a foundation, as within 
Kantianism. According to Bergson, the first step towards morality is a 
conditioned form of instinct, namely habit which comes in forms of 
pressure from the closed society. The individual is in this case understood 
as a part of a greater whole, where it necessarily must act morally right in 
order to maintain social cohesion. This thereby also entails that the 
individual understands the virtue of fulfilling its moral obligation, and 
thus recognizes its role in society. However, within Kantian morality, this 
would not suffice, since he considers the free willing of an action to be 
crucial in order to act upon reason, and consequently in order to follow 
the categorical imperative. But according to Bergson, man also has a free 
will in connection to his intelligence, which he uses to acknowledge his 
social obligation. In that sense, the categorical imperative and the social 
obligation are both two kinds of behavioural guidelines for the individual 
to follow. Whereas Kant starts in reason and ends in reason, Bergson’s 
social and moral obligation starts with society influencing the individual, 
and hence reason becomes a product of the pressure from society. In both 
cases reason cannot be completely excluded. For Kant, the individual 
would not be able to suffice the categorical imperative without reason, 
since this would make him unable to realise the consequences of his 
actions, and thereby his behaviour would, hypothetically, resemble that of 
an animal.  If intelligence, which Bergson calls the source of reason, is 
withdrawn from the social morality in a closed society, man would in this 
case only be left with his instinctive habits similar to that of the bees. 
This would necessarily entail that there would be nothing called moral 
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obligation, since this is dependent upon intelligence. A moral obligation 
can only be considered a moral obligation if the individual recognises it, 
otherwise it would be mere instinct. 
  
To sum up, the moral guidelines of both Kant and Bergson are two 
different ways of looking upon the individual’s influence on morality. 
Whereas Kant finds the individual to have autonomy along with a reason 
capable of understanding the categorical imperative, Bergson does also 
regard the individual as autonomous, who thereby has a free will to break 
out from the moral obligation. However, the autonomy of the individual 
is here dominated by its ability to reason. In each case both individuals 
have autonomy, in the sense that they can always choose not to follow the 
rules of the categorical imperative or the moral obligation of the closed 
society. Similarly for them both, the consequences of such an action 
would be vital. For both Kant and Bergson, a being with reason is well 
aware of this, as a man with intelligence will use his reason to conclude 
that staying on the right path will be the best choice for both himself and 
his fellow beings. 
   
Despite the fact that there is an apparent focus on the autonomy of 
individuals in Kant’s moral philosophy, humanity still remains a 
necessity, since the notion of the universal law could not exist without a 
humanity to apply it to. The individual can therefore not be considered 
isolated from the rest of humanity. Hence, despite the fact that Kant does 
not explicitly mention the relationship between the individual and 
humanity, one could argue that the consequences of individuals breaking 
the categorical imperative would in the end be catastrophic for humanity. 
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This bears a resemblance to Bergson’s concept of social obligation; that it 
is a necessity in order to maintain social cohesion.  
 
Social obligation can also be compared to Kant’s explanation of the 
rational beings instinctive respect of law, namely duty. The concept of 
duty is needed to suffice the categorical imperative; however it does not 
overrule the individual’s autonomy in matters that clash with personal 
values and principles. Nonetheless, the closed society is likely to overrule 
these clashes by appealing to the individual’s reason in order to maintain 
social cohesion. Despite the arguments for the individual’s maintenance 
of the categorical imperative, namely duty and on Bergson’s side, social 
obligation, one could go further and ask if there was more for the 
individual to gain. When exploring the moral philosophy of Kant and that 
of Bergson, one realises that the matter of religion is inevitable in order to 
answer this question. 
 
Religion 
Along with Bergson’s closed society there is a static religion connected. 
Static religion is a preventive tool against human intelligence used by 
closed society in its preservation of social cohesion. Bergson argues that 
this revolution against social obligation derives from two sources, namely 
selfishness and human despair of death. The idea of an all-powerful God 
who watches over one’s actions and images of punishments or rewards in 
the afterlife gives man a personal ideal to strive for, along with a reason 
as to why he should act morally right. From this one can draw a parallel 
to Kant’s concept of the summum bonum. With this concept he gives an 
answer to what the individual gains by acting morally right. Quite similar 
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to Bergson, Kant explains how the individual will have to face the 
consequences of his actions, however Kant uses the notion of being 
worthy of happiness in the hereafter.  
 
This is the only place in Kant’s moral philosophy where he is in need of a 
God. However, Kant does not attempt to prove the existence of God, as 
he only needs the possibility of God’s existence in order to suffice a 
reason for acting morally right. Bergson neither tries to prove the 
existence of God, but that is due to completely different reasons. For him 
God is a given fact all the way through his philosophy and in the end of 
vital importance for obtaining absolute morality. The argument for the 
summum bonum constitutes an ideal for man to strive for: “complete 
moral virtue together with complete happiness” (SEP). Nevertheless, the 
static religion of a closed society does not represent an ideal as such, 
since static religion is a tool used by closed society with the purpose of 
maintaining social cohesion. Despite the fact that both social cohesion 
and moral obligation are upheld in the closed society, Bergson argues that 
absolute morality can only be obtained in an open society. 
Summing up, one could say that the higher purpose of Kant’s moral 
philosophy is to show an ideal of moral action, while Bergson’s closed 
society accounts for how an individual functions in a society and how 
morality and religion are incorporated. As previously mentioned, 
Bergson’s philosophy of both morality and religion are twofold. 
Respectively, the open society and dynamic religion are of higher order 
than the closed society and static religion. The open society constitutes an 
ideal by involving dynamic religion. Bergson does not describe the open 
society on the same grounds as the closed society, since open society is 
somehow an ideal society, which man should strive for. For it to succeed 
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there is a need of a mystic to go beyond the pressure of the closed society 
and to embrace all of humanity. The link to dynamic religion is of great 
importance as it is through this religion that mystics obtain absolute 
morality. The shift from closed to open morality is essential to 
emphasize, since this is where the individual goes beyond intelligence 
and perceives morality from a completely new perspective. It also entails 
that the mystic relieves itself from the pressure of society. The radical 
change of the individual thereby informs us that the dilemma between 
social obligation and intelligence is no longer of importance to the 
mystic. To have obtained complete morality through God means that the 
mystic has been enlightened, and is now able to embrace mankind out of 
pure love and aspiration. By this, there is no reason as to why the mystics 
should doubt the open morality, and hereby one can argue that Bergson 
sees the open morality as an ideal, which is obtainable in the mortal 
world. This account is an extension of his sociological and historical 
description of humanity, where the concept of religion is once again taken 
to be a natural fact.   
 
Though Kant’s moral philosophy resembles Bergson’s closed morality by 
arguing for the summum bonum, it also suffices to resemble the open 
morality by being a concept of an ideal. However, Kant’s notion of the 
ideal is only attainable by the immortality of the soul, consequently only 
to be achieved in the afterlife. Kant also never mentions a specific 
religion, but only uses the concept of a deity in a logical and rational 
manner, whereas Bergson sees Christianity and the Christian mystics as 
the only ones who have been capable of reaching complete morality. We 
can thus see that even though Kant and Bergson have a significantly 
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different approach to the study of morality and religion, they are both in 
need of reason and God to explain their own version of an ideal morality.  
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Conclusion 
After having studied Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson, we can verify 
that they have two very different approaches to the study of morality and 
religion. While Kant maintains a strict a priori methodology, Bergson 
approaches the topic with a sociological and historical angle. However, as 
our discussion shows, they bear a closer resemblance than first 
anticipated. First, the concept of reason has shown itself to be essential 
for both philosophers, since the individual’s ability to reason is intrinsic 
to its moral judgment. Whereas Kant sees it as the individual’s ability to 
act in such a way that it can be applied as a universal law, the categorical 
imperative, Bergson sees morality as incorporated into society, which is 
then indirectly imposed upon the individual. Furthermore, despite having 
different points of departure as well as ends, they both find themselves in 
need of the concept of religion in order to explain why one should care to 
act morally right. Even though morality and religion can be studied 
separately, religion becomes a necessity in order to explain the higher 
purpose of morality – in Kantian terms the summum bonum and within 
Bergsonism absolute morality.  
 
From the connection we have found between morality and religion within 
Kant and Bergson’s philosophy, one could take it to another level and 
question whether or not this applies to the real world in practice. Are 
religion and morality also inseparable in modern societies today? James 
Rachels, a University Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Alabama at Birmingham, argues how in “Popular thinking, morality and 
religion are inseparable: People commonly believe that morality can be 
understood only in the context of religion” (Rachels, 1999: 54). It is 
important to note that, although other religions have had a large influence, 
47 
 
Christianity is what people generally have in mind when discussing 
religion in relation to morality. One can find several situations where 
morality and religion are interconnected. For example, in the United 
States where 90 percent of the population believe in God (Rachels, 1999: 
53), the health sector often uses priests as authorities within moral issues, 
such as abortion and organ donation.  Not only do the priests function as 
spiritual guides, but they also use their insight to assist in more practical 
matters. This is similar to what Kant and Bergson conclude, that religion 
can often be an answer to moral issues, by giving a higher purpose for the 
individual to strive for, in matters that might seem incomprehensible for 
the mind to handle. Summing up, it is interesting to see to which extent 
aging philosophical theories remain valid in modern societies. Even 
though the degree of religion’s influence varies from each society, 
country or continent, morality is still today an important branch of 
philosophy, as well as an important field within the modern world.  
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Formalia 
Group Dynamics 
This is our second semester at HIB. When we first started the group 
formation process back in January, we all came with our different share 
of experience from the first semester, which had been a very busy, but 
nonetheless motivating semester. The group that was to be formed was 
not filled with strangers, but with three out of four group members, that 
had worked together before. The four of us first chose to work with the 
student proposal called “Philosophy of Time Travel”. We did not know 
exactly what our specific focus would be, but we were all somehow 
interested in the concept of time, so the following weeks we discussed 
back and fourth what could be interesting to work with. At the same time 
a new member entered the group, who had not been there doing the week 
of project formation. Unfortunately she had some personal issues she was 
dealing with, and did not show up very often to our meetings, so we 
talked to her about it and in the end she decided herself to leave the 
group. When we got to the problem formulation seminar in mid February, 
we were still dealing with the concept of time, but not time travel. We 
were instead all interested in how time is perceived within different 
cultures and religions in the world, for example by comparing an Eastern 
philosopher with a Western. However, when trying to go more in to the 
subject matter and find interesting material about it, we somehow it to be 
too intangible and not very precise. However while we were still on the 
subject of time, we stumbled across Henri Bergson, which we found to 
have some interesting ideas about morality and religion. Moreover we 
still intended to have two views upon the same subject matter, so we 
agreed to include an already introduced philosopher, namely Immanuel 
Kant. As a result, we changed direction from working with the concept of 
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time to “Two Philosophical views upon Morality and Religion”. After 
having found literature, we started reading, contemplating and discussing 
what their philosophies really concerned and how they could be set up 
against each other. Later in the process, after the midterm seminar, the 
concept of reason came into the picture, to give more crisp to our project, 
as it showed to be of great importance for both philosophers. Finally after 
giving a glance back on this last months, we can say to have worked very 
hard on a difficult topic, which definitely has been a good and interesting 
exercise. We have worked very well together, although having many 
philosophical and heated discussions, with the boys in one corner being 
pro-Kant and the girls being pro-Bergson in the other. 
 
Summary in Danish 
”Two Philosophical Views upon Morality and Religion” eller ”To 
filosofiske synspunkter på moral- og religionsfilosofi” indeholder en 
gennemgang af Immanuel Kant og Henri Bergsons teorier om moral- og 
religionsfilosofi, herunder Kants kategoriske imparativ og summum 
bonum, samt Bergsons moralsk forpligtelse og den indflydelse samfundet 
og religion har på denne. Efterfølgende viser en gennemgående analyse, 
at Kant og Bergson begge har menneskets intellekt og fornuft som en 
afgørende faktor for dets moralske handlinger. Her efter bliver der sat 
fokus på de fundne fællestræk indenfor deres opfattelse af et moralsk 
ideal, samt indførslen af religion som en nødvendig foranstaltning for 
deres moralfilosofi. Rapporten skaber afslutningsvis en perspektivering til 
moralens rolle indenfor den moderne verden, samt nutidige 
konstellationer af moral og religion.  
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Summary in German 
”Two Philosophical Views upon Morality and Religion” oder ”Zwei 
philosophische Gesichtspunkte über Moral und Religion” enthält ein 
Durchgang der Theorien von Moral und Religion von Immanuel Kant 
und Henri Bergson, hierunter das Kategorische Imperativ und Summum 
Bonum von Kant sowie moralische Verpflichtung von Bergson und den 
Einfluss die die Gesellschaft und die Religion darauf hat. Anschließend 
zeigt eine durchgreifende Analyse dass sowohl Kant als auch Bergson 
dass das menschliche Intellekt und die Vernunft bestimmende Faktoren 
für die moralische Handlungen sind. Danach wird auf die gefundene 
gemeinsame Züge innerhalb deren Auffassung eines moralischen Ideals 
fokussiert, sowie auch die Einführung von Religion als notwendige 
Veranstaltung ihrer moralischen Philosophie. Abschließend schafft der 
Rapport eine Perspektivierung auf die Rolle der Moral innerhalb der 
modernen Welt, sowie die gegenwärtige Vermischung von Moral und 
Religion. 
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